Formalism: From Racial Integration to Same-Sex Marriage by Lau, Holning
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 2
1-2008
Formalism: From Racial Integration to Same-Sex
Marriage
Holning Lau
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Holning Lau, Formalism: From Racial Integration to Same-Sex Marriage, 59 Hastings L.J. 843 (2008).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol59/iss4/2
Formalism: From Racial Integration to
Same-Sex Marriage
HOLNING LAU*
Racial integration and same-sex marriage both headlined political
and legal commentary during the summer of 2007. On one hand, the
United States Supreme Court prompted discussion by holding, in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. i ("Parents
Involved"),' that Seattle's and Louisville's voluntary efforts to integrate
schools were unconstitutional On the other hand, commentators
weighed in on litigation, legislation, and presidential candidates'
platforms on same-sex marriage.' While racial integration and same-sex
marriage captured attention, commentators typically addressed the two
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Michael Kang, Katy Kuh, Chris Littleton, Dean Spade, and Ed Stein. I also thank Mary Anne Case,
Robin Charlow, and Liz Glazer for enriching conversations on this project. All errors, of course,
remain my own.
i. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (plurality opinion).
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Fracturing a Landmark, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at 34; Editorial,
Resegregation Now, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A28; Donald Jones, Op-Ed.. Race: Integration
Benefits Us All, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 2007, at A35; Kenneth W. Mack, Op-Ed., Which Side Is
Brown v. Board on?, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at 21; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Op-Ed., Brown's Legacy
Lives, but Barely, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2007, at 17A.
3. See, e.g., Mike Doming & Christi Parsons, Dems Walk Fine Line at Gay Issues Forum: Rights
Yes, Marriage No, Cm. TRIB., Aug. sO, 2007, at 4 (discussing Democratic presidential candidates'
positions on same-sex marriage); Editorial, Inadequacy of Civil Unions, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2oo7, at
A34 (discussing Connecticut's pending same-sex marriage litigation). Additionally, from July 30, 2007,
to August 6, 2007, the Los Angeles Times ran an online debate about same-sex marriage. Golden State,
Same-Sex Marriages, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2007, http:lwww.latimes.comlnews/opinion/la-op-dustup
30ju13o,o,6536452.story; Changing Views on Marriage, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2007, http://www.latimes.
comlnews/opinion/la-op-dustup31jul3l,o,69952o6.story; Society and Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. I, 2007, http://www.latimes.corn/news/opinion/la-op-dustupiaug oI,o, 1754615.story; God, Gays
and Government, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, http:/www.latimes.comlnewslopinionlla-op-dustup
2augo2,0,2213369.story; The Future of Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/
news/opinion/la-op-dustup3augo3,o,2672123.story.
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topics discretely.4 But how might one area of legal development relate to
the other?
Parents Involved impacts equal protection jurisprudence beyond the
context of racial integration,5 extending specifically to prohibitions of
same-sex marriage. Ironically, the five Supreme Court Justices who
formed a majority in the case-four of whom are commonly labeled as
social conservatives-bolstered the case for same-sex marriage.' They did
so by introducing a new exercise of formalism to equal protection
analysis. This Article explores this doctrinal development and its
normative complications.7
In same-sex marriage litigation, the couples usually assert multiple
constitutional arguments for same-sex marriage, one of which is a sex
discrimination argument.8 Consider a hypothetical woman who wishes to
marry her female partner. Except in Massachusetts, she cannot legally do
so.9 She cannot because she is a woman-that is to say, because of her
sex. If she were a man, she would have no problem tying the knot with
her female partner.'" Thus, the argument follows that bans on same-sex
marriage" contain sex-based distinctions that warrant heightened
4. See supra notes 2-3.
5. Seattle and Louisville referred interchangeably to their school programs as "racial
integration," "racial balancing," and "racial diversity" programs. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at
2759 (plurality opinion). For consistency purposes, this Article adopts the term "racial integration."
6. Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas signed the plurality opinion. Id. at 2746. They are
often considered social conservatives. See, e.g., Posting of Cass Sunstein to the University of Chicago
Law School Faculty Blog, Four New Horsemen? Of Minimalists and Visionaries,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/o6/four-new-horsem.html (June 28, 20o7, 1:47 PM)
(describing those four Justices as a conservative bloc). Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote,
concurring in part and in judgment. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746 (plurality opinion).
7. As discussed in Part III, normative complications arise because advocates for same-sex
couples might hesitate to assert their newly bolstered doctrinal claim; they may hold normative biases
against formalism, generally, and its specific manifestation in the sex discrimination argument for
same-sex marriage.
8. For the remainder of this Article, the term "sex discrimination argument" is used as
shorthand for the "sex discrimination argument for same-sex marriage." In addition to arguing that
same-sex marriage bans amount to unconstitutional sex discrimination, couples typically argue that
such bans violate their constitutionally protected freedom to marry and constitutional protection
against sexual orientation discrimination. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Three Arguments for Gay
Rights, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1636 (2007).
9. Prompted by Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the
Massachusetts government began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. See Yvonne Abraham
& Rick Klein, Free to Marry: Historic Date Arrives for Same-Sex Couples in Massachusetts, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 17, 2004, at Ai.
io. Of course, this hypothetical assumes that, by marrying, the parties would not violate laws such
as prohibitions against incest, bigamy, and underage marriage.
ii. By speaking of same-sex marriage "bans," this Article refers to both de jure bans (e.g.,
constitutional amendments and statutes explicitly defining marriage as unions between one man and
one woman) and de facto bans (e.g., governmental assumptions that the term "marriage" only refers to
unions between one man and one woman). For an example of a de facto ban, see Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 20o6) (noting that all parties to the litigation agreed that New York's Domestic
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scrutiny.'2
Most courts reject this sex discrimination argument for same-sex
marriage. They maintain that, in equal protection analysis, a sex-based
distinction does not trigger heightened scrutiny if it is applied equally to
men and women, unless the law subordinates one sex to the other.'4
These courts conclude that bans on same-sex marriage apply equally to
both men and women (i.e., both have their marriage options limited
based on their sex), and neither group is subordinated; thus, heightened
scrutiny is unwarranted.'5
To justify their reasoning, these courts discuss Loving v. Virginia,'6
arguing that Virginia's antimiscegenation law triggered heightened
scrutiny, even though it applied equally to whites and non-whites, only
because the law reinforced white supremacy. Because of Loving, these
courts have developed a substance-based test for discerning when to
exercise heightened scrutiny: for an equally applied race- or sex-based
distinction to trigger heightened scrutiny, the law must subordinate a
racial group or sex, respectively.
The plurality and concurring opinions in Parents Involved essentially
rejected such a substance-based test. According to Parents Involved, all
laws that make race-based distinctions-even equally applied distinctions
in integration programs"-are now subject to heightened scrutiny
regardless of their substantive effects.'9 This new formalism bolsters the
Relation Law implicitly limited marriage to opposite-sex couples and that the government's
application of the law actualized that limitation).
r2. Part I.B elaborates on this argument, including a version of the argument that goes one step
further, claiming that marriage law's sex-based distinctions subordinate women. I use the term
"heightened scrutiny" as an umbrella term referring to standards of review that are more stringent
than rational basis review. Whereas sex discrimination is reviewed under heightened scrutiny, courts
usually subject sexual orientation discrimination to rational basis review. Therefore, if same-sex
couples convince courts that same-sex marriage bans are a form of sex discrimination, not just sexual
orientation discrimination, they strengthen their case considerably. For further discussion on the sex
discrimination argument's significance in same-sex couples' litigation strategies, see infra notes 54-56
and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. See infra Part I.C. But see infra Part I.B (summarizing commentators' arguments that bans on
same-sex marriage do, in fact, subordinate women).
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia's antimiscegenation law was unconstitutional).
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. For an explanation of why schools' racial integration programs are equally applied laws, see
infra Part II.A.I.
19. See infra Part II.A.2.
20. As shorthand, this Article uses the phrase "new formalism" to refer to this new instance of
formalism. The phrase does not suggest that the Court had never exercised formalism in the past. Nor
does the phrase refer to a new judicial philosophy distinct from existing understandings of formalism.
Formalism and substantive reasoning coexist in the law. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism,
and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 286-87 (1993) ("Both formal and
substantive reasoning are 'inherent in any viable conception of law,' and are utilized in any complex
March 2008]
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sex discrimination argument for same-sex marriage.2" Opponents of the
sex discrimination argument who have been relying on Loving must now
reconsider Loving in light of the Court's new formalism.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. First, Part I
distinguishes between formal and substantive inquiries in equal
protection analyses and explains how that distinction relates to the sex
discrimination argument and courts' rejections of the argument. Part II
provides a reading of Parents Involved as an embrace of formalism and
contends that such formalism strengthens the sex discrimination
argument. Part III discusses the sex discrimination argument's normative
weaknesses-which coexist with doctrinal strength-and discusses the
normative weaknesses of formalism generally. To manage these
shortcomings, Part III prescribes ways for jurists to incorporate the sex
discrimination argument and formalism into equal protection
jurisprudence, while accounting for their normative drawbacks. Finally,
this Article concludes by summarizing its main points and reflects on the
likely unintended nature of Parents Involved's effects on same-sex
marriage litigation.
I. BETWEEN FORM AND SUBSTANCE:
SITUATING THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT
Courts' and commentators' embrace of formalism have fluctuated
over time. Formalism's high watermark is often attributed to Christopher
Langdell's writings from the early twentieth century." Beginning in the
1930s, legal realists subjected Langdell's formalism to intense criticism. 3
Today, growing formalist movements exist among commentators ranging
from Scalia-styled textualists to a group of contracts scholars who have
labeled themselves "New Formalists.,2 4
legal system.... [Liegal decisionmakers employ some mix of formal and substantive reasoning."
(quoting P.S. ATIYA & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 3 (1987)).
In Part III.A.2, I discuss how instances of formalism and substantive reasoning should coexist in equal
protection analyses.
21. Parents Involved's formalism bolsters the sex discrimination argument by suggesting that sex-
based distinctions in same-sex marriage bans should trigger heightened scrutiny. Note that it is outside
the scope of this Article to comprehensively analyze whether the bans should survive heightened
scrutiny. However, I do predict that survival is unlikely. See infra notes 54-59, 114 and accompanying
text.
22. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
170-74 (Belknap Press 1995) (1993) (describing Langdell's role in promoting legal formalism). But see
Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, i9o6-2ooos, 22
LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 302-11 (20O4) (arguing that other commentators have caricatured Langdell's
contribution to formalism).
23. For an example of such criticism, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, IO HARV.
L. REV. 456, 465-68 (1897), reprinted in 110 HARv. L. REV. 991,997-IOOO (1997).
24. On Justice Scalia's formalistic textualism, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23-25 (997). On the New Formalists, see Mark L. Movsesian,
Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary, 12 Ius GENTIUM 115, 115-44
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Despite such fluctuations in jurisprudence generally, American
equal protection jurisprudence has been relatively consistently
formalistic. 25 One exception has been the jurisprudence on laws that
distinguish based on race or sex, but are applied equally between races
and sexes, respectively. This Part elaborates on how the sex
discrimination argument has been framed as one such exceptional case.
A. FORMAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE INQUIRIES
Because this Article is concerned with formalism in equal
protection, it is worth defining this Article's use of the terms "formal
inquiry" and "substantive inquiry" to describe analyses in equal
protection contexts. The term "formal inquiry" refers to self-contained
analyses that emphasize rule-based deductive logic., 6 In formal inquiries,
judges simply juxtapose a disputed law and a doctrinal rule, and then
deduce their relationship. These inquiries are self-contained because
judges do not need to look beyond that which is stated by law. In
contrast, the term "substantive inquiry" refers to analyses of law's social
effects.27 Such examination of social consequences necessarily requires
judges to look beyond the law itself to the law's effects and to the law's
purposes, insofar as purposes are suggestive of effects.2s
To clarify this difference between formal and substantive inquiries,
(2006) (describing New Formalism and arguing that its differences from classical formalism are
minimal).
25. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Putting "Protection" Back in the Equal Protection Clause:
Lessons from Nineteenth Century Women's Rights Activists' Understandings of Equality, 13 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REV. 429, 434 (2004) (describing formalism as pervading equal protection jurisprudence
on sex); Shira Galinsky, Returning the Language of Fairness to Equal Protection: Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's Affirmative Action Jurisprudence in Grutter and Gratz and Beyond, 7 N.Y. Crrv L. REV.
357, 363 (2004) (describing equal protection jurisprudence as "dominated" by formalism); R.A.
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 875
(2004) (describing equal protection jurisprudence on race as formalistic). For specific examples of how
formalism has manifested in equal protection jurisprudence, see infra Part IIC, discussing the Court's
treatment of pregnancy discrimination and affirmative action.
26. See, e.g., Herbert Hovencamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74
IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1023 (989) ("Legal formalism instructed lawyers searching for the law not to look
outside their case reporters. Many of America's elite lawyers came to believe that the law, like
mathematics, was a closed system."); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 781, 793 (1989) ("Traditionally, legal 'formalism' is the position that a unique answer in a
particular case can be 'deduced' from a rule .... "); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509,
522 (1988) (noting that commentators often equate formalism to approaching law "as a closed system,
within which judgments are mechanically deducible").
27. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217, 263
(20o5) (suggesting that inquiries concerning "substantive equality look to a rule's results and effects");
Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Protection: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1687, 1699 (1986) (arguing that substantive equality is assessed by examining the "outcomes" of
government policy).
28. See Cloud, supra note 20, at 220 ("Formal reasons for decision contrast with extra-legal
substantive reasons: 'moral, economic, political, institutional, or other social consideration[s]' upon
which a decision can be based.").
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consider the dictionary definition of "discrimination." Dictionaries
typically offer at least two definitions of discrimination that map
separately onto a formal inquiry and onto a substantive inquiry.
First, dictionaries define discrimination as the making of
distinctions.29 Accordingly, the question-whether a policy discriminates
based on sex-translates into a formal inquiry: does the policy make a
sex-based distinction? This inquiry is a self-contained exercise of
deductive reasoning. One merely has to look at a policy and ascertain
whether it makes sex-based distinctions. For example, applying a formal
inquiry to an equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court concluded
that pregnancy discrimination is not a form of sex discrimination.3" If the
government has a policy of terminating pregnant employees, it is not
making a distinction based on sex. On its face, the policy does not
distinguish between men and women; it only distinguishes between the
pregnant and non-pregnant.
Dictionaries also offer a second definition of discrimination as the
disadvantaging of a group.' Accordingly, the question-whether a policy
discriminates based on sex-can be answered through a substantive
inquiry: does a policy disadvantage one sex vis-a-vis the other? This
inquiry requires looking beyond the policy itself and examining its social
effects. Through a substantive inquiry, foreign courts, such as the
Supreme Court of Canada, have decided that pregnancy discrimination
indeed amounts to sex discrimination because pregnancy discrimination
has the social effect of disadvantaging women.32
Equal protection analyses of race and sex discrimination usually
29. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 517 (4th ed. 2006) ("the
ability or power to see or make fine distinctions"); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 358
(IIth ed. 2005) ("the quality or power of finely distinguishing"); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 564 (2d ed. 2001) ("the power of making fine distinctions"). In his oft-cited,
seminal article, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, Owen Fiss used the term "antidiscrimination
principle" to refer to a principle against distinction-making. See 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (976).
Subsequent commentators, however, have noted that Fiss's definition of "discrimination" is not
exhaustive. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, tO (2004).
30. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974). Similarly, the Court concluded that
pregnancy discrimination does not amount to sex discrimination with regard to Title VII claims. See
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976). However, the Court recognized in Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983), that the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), overruled Gilbert.
3I. For example, the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary defines "discrimination" as
"prejudiced or prejudicial outlook, action, or treatment." and defines "prejudicial" as "tending to
injure or impair." MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 358, 979. Accord
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 29, at 517, 3184; RANDOM
HOUSE WEBSTER's UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 564, I525; see also Balkin & Siegel,
supra note 29, at to (suggesting that an "antidiscrimination principle" can be defined as opposition to
subordination).
32. See Brooks v. Can. Safeway Ltd., [1989] i S.C.R. 1219, 1240 (Can.).
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contain two questions. First, the threshold question: does a law
discriminate, thus triggering heightened scrutiny? Second, the
justification question: if a law does trigger heightened scrutiny, can the
government justify its discrimination pursuant to heightened scrutiny?33
Both of these questions can be framed as either formal or substantive
inquiries.
As illustrated by the example of pregnancy discrimination, the first
question-whether a law amounts to sex discrimination-can be either
formalistic or substantive in nature, depending on how one defines
"discrimination." 34  Similarly, the second question-whether
discrimination can be justified-can also be either formal or substantive
in nature. Consider Gerald Gunther's old adage that strict scrutiny has
become "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."35 The adage suggests that
strict scrutiny of race discrimination is now highly formalistic; there is a
simple formula: if a law discriminates by race, it will never withstand
constitutional challenge, regardless of the law's substantive social effects.
Gunther's adage has been contradicted only in rare instances, such
as the case of Grutter v. Bollinger,6 in which the University of Michigan
Law School's affirmative action policy survived constitutional challenge.37
When heightened scrutiny is not fatal in fact, the inquiry is substantive.
In Grutter, for example, the Court considered the affirmative action
program's social effects in order to reach its conclusion that
discrimination was justified.38
33. Courts have not always been explicit in disaggregating these two questions, but the separation
has become apparent to observers. For background on this two-step nature of equal protection
analyses, see generally WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1016-19
(3d ed. 2003). For characterization of the first step as a "threshold" question, see, e.g., Richard Banks,
Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1075, 1109 (2001), and Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 532
(2004). For labeling the second step as a "justification" question, see Banks, supra, at 1109. During the
second step, race and sex discrimination are subject to different levels of heightened scrutiny-strict
scrutiny for race discrimination and intermediate scrutiny for sex discrimination. See MURPHY, supra at
906-IOI9.
34. Recall that the United States' formalistic definition and Canada's substantive definition
resulted in divergent understandings of pregnancy discrimination. See supra notes 29-32 and
accompanying text.
35. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
36. 539 U.S. 3o6 (2003). Since Gunther published his article, his adage has proved wrong only in
one other case. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 170 (1987) (holding that an affirmative
action policy survived strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination).
One other instance in which race-based discrimination survived strict scrutiny predated Gunther's
article. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the government's policy
of Japanese internment).
37. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
38. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated that the affirmative action policy was
narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of attaining a diverse law school class-a goal deemed a
compelling government interest. See id.
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The remainder of this Article focuses on the threshold question,
because it is at the first step of equal protection analysis that judges
typically reject the sex discrimination argument. The Court has typically
approached the threshold question in a highly formalistic fashion. As
already discussed, for example, the Court deemed pregnancy
discrimination not sex discrimination because of the Court's formalistic
approach. Indeed, in Washington v. Davis, the Court announced that a
facially neutral law does not trigger heightened scrutiny, even if it
disparately disadvantages a suspect class, unless the plaintiff can prove
that the law was driven by an invidious motive.39 Thus, when
discrimination is not found from a formal inquiry, the substantive criteria
for heightened scrutiny is extremely difficult to satisfy: the plaintiff must
show not only that a law has adverse social effects on a suspect class, but
that those effects were motivated by invidious intent.'
A notable exception, when judges have been partial to substantive
inquiry even though formal distinctions exist, is the context of laws that
distinguish on the basis of race or sex but are applied equally among
relevant classes. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas,4 Justice Scalia
opined in his dissenting opinion that Texas' prohibition of same-sex
sodomy did not amount to sex discrimination triggering heightened
scrutiny.4" Justice Scalia conceded that the law created a sex-based
distinction: "To be sure, [the sodomy law] does distinguish between the
sexes.., men can violate the law only with other men, and women only
with other women."43 However, Justice Scalia reasoned that equal
application of the distinction neutralized the distinction and, therefore,
plaintiffs needed to prove the law's subordinating dynamics in order for
the law to warrant heightened scrutiny.44 The following two sections will
39. 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976).
40. It is extremely difficult to prove invidious intent. See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After
September ii: The Department of Justice's 2oo3 Guidelines, 50 Loy. L. REV. 67, 72 (2004) (discussing
the difficulty of proving intent in disparate-impact challenges against racial profiling); Reva Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REV. I I 11, 1137 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court's test of invidious intent "is one that
the sociological and psychological studies of racial bias suggest plaintiffs will rarely be able to prove").
41. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
42. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority did not discuss the sex discrimination aspect of
the case. Rather, the majority held that Texas' sodomy law violated the Constitution's protection of
substantive due process. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor also did
not address sex discrimination. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
43. Id. at 599-600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id. Justice Scalia rejected the counterargument that equally applied sex-based distinctions
should warrant heightened scrutiny because the Court reviewed antimiscegenation laws' equally
applied race-based distinctions under heightened scrutiny; Justice Scalia argued that it was proper to
review antimiscegenation laws under heightened scrutiny precisely because their purpose was to
subordinate. See id. (distinguishing the antimiscegenation law in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
arguing that, while the antimiscegenation law was "designed to maintain White Supremacy," Texas'
sodomy law was neither intended to subordinate women to men nor vice versa).
[Vol. 59:843
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flesh out Justice Scalia's perspective by examining the sex discrimination
argument and its rejection among judges.4"
B. THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT
The sex discrimination argument is straightforward as a formal
matter. Except in Massachusetts, a man cannot marry another man
because he is a man, and a woman cannot marry another woman because
she is a woman. In this way, the law restricts individuals' marriage
options based on their sex. Put differently, marriage laws contain sex-
based distinctions. Accordingly, based on a formal definition of
discrimination, marriage laws are discriminatory.46
It is worth noting that the sex discrimination argument is not limited
to the context of marriage. Sexual orientation discrimination in any
context can be framed logically as sex discrimination. Consider the
hypothetical of a heterosexist employer.47 The employer commits sex
discrimination if she refuses to hire John simply because he dates men,
but hires Joan who also dates men. The employer has discriminated
between John and Joan based on their sex.
Formal analysis aside, proponents of the sex discrimination
argument contend that the argument furthers the social goal of
combating the subordination of women.4" Patriarchal ideology dictates
that men should perform masculine social scripts (e.g., play football, be
assertive, be the breadwinner, be the authority figure within the family)
while women should perform feminine social scripts (e.g., be the
cheerleader, be demure, be the homemaker, be the nurturing figure
within the family).49 Norms that restrict men and women to distinct social
scripts promote male power because mainstream culture associates the
masculine scripts with power.5" Heterosexism demands that men perform
45. Some observers may consider Justice Scalia's approach to be consistent with formalism,
viewing what he did as creating a formalistic, categorical exception (for equally applied distinctions) to
a formalistic rule (that distinctions constitute discrimination). Justice Scalia's exception, however, is
not purely formalistic because equally applied distinctions are only excepted if they do not
subordinate. Parents Involved created a new, purely formalistic rule: distinctions constitute
discrimination- no exceptions.
46. Andrew Koppelman, who has written extensively on the sex discrimination argument, refers
to this formal argument as the "analytic argument." See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination
Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197. 208-14 0994).
47. For a pioneering discussion on the sex discrimination argument in employment discrimination
contexts, see I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual) Orientation and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. II58
(991).
48. Andrew Koppelman refers to this dynamic as the "sociological" component of the sex
discrimination argument. See Koppelman, supra note 46, at 220-73; see also, e.g., Capers, supra note
47, at 1159-70 (discussing the relationship between heterosexism and sexism); Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 229 (same); Cass R.
Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 16-23 (994) (same).
49. See supra note 48.
50. See supra note 48.
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a particular social script while women perform another. As Sylvia Law
put it, heterosexist social expectations dictate that "[r]eal men are and
should be sexually attracted to women, and real women invite and enjoy
that attraction."5' In this way, heterosexism reifies patriarchy by
reinforcing the significance of sex-based social scripts. 2 If sex-based
social scripts are pillars that support the subordination of women,
compelled heterosexuality is one of those pillars.
Considering this relationship between heterosexism and patriarchy,
advocates of the sex discrimination argument maintain that the argument
is more than a self-contained exercise in formal reasoning. Rather,
framing sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination is
justified from a substantive perspective because heterosexism has the
social effect of reinforcing the subordination of women. Prominent legal
scholars have endorsed this substantive view of the sex discrimination
argument. 3 As discussed below, however, courts have generally either
ignored or rejected this substantive view, construing the sex
discrimination argument as simplistically formalistic reasoning.
C. REJECTION OF THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT
In same-sex marriage litigation, couples' attorneys have a strategic
interest in pushing a sex discrimination claim. Courts generally review
equal protection claims against sexual orientation discrimination under
rational basis review. 4 Courts review sex discrimination, however, under
heightened scrutiny.55 Accordingly, if a court accepts same-sex couples'
claims that same-sex marriage bans discriminate on the basis of sex, the
51. Law, supra note 48, at 196; see also Koppelman, supra note 46, at 235 ("Most Americans learn
no later than high school that one of the nastier sanctions that one will suffer if one deviates from the
behavior traditionally deemed appropriate for one's sex is the imputation of homosexuality. The two
stigmas, sex-inappropriateness and homosexuality, are virtually interchangeable, and each is readily
used as a metaphor for the other.") (emphasis omitted).
52. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 48, at i 167 ("Lesbians and gays ... by the symbolic significance
of their acts, threaten the bipolar gender system that perpetuates the subordination of women.... [For
example, wihen lesbians and gays question a society that denies them the right to adopt children, they
question a society that says it is a woman's place to raise children, a man's place to be the
breadwinner, and both are needed to constitute a family.").
53. See id.
54. See generally MURPHY, supra note 33, at IOI6-I9. In previous writing, I have challenged the
appropriateness of reviewing sexual orientation discrimination under rational basis review. See
Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity: American Law in Light of East Asian
Developments, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2oo8).
55. Sex discrimination is reviewed under different levels of heightened scrutiny. Federal courts
review sex discrimination under "intermediate" scrutiny. See generally MURPHY, supra note 33, at
l16-19. Some state courts, however, review sex discrimination under "strict" or "near absolutist"
scrutiny. See generally Linda J. Wharton. State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their
Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERs L.J. 1201, 1240-4t
nn.179-81 (2oo5) (collecting sources on state laws).
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state will have a heavier burden of justifying its discrimination.6
Whether a court accepts that same-sex marriage bans amount to sex
discrimination will highly influence a case's outcome. Existing court
opinions support this prediction. When judges have accepted that same-
sex marriage bans amount to sex discrimination, the bans typically have
not survived heightened scrutiny. For example, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii held in 1993 that Hawaii's same-sex marriage ban discriminated
on the basis of sex. 7 On remand, the lower court found that the ban
could not withstand strict scrutiny." Similarly, a handful of other state
judges have agreed that same-sex marriage bans amount to sex
discrimination, and then subsequently found that the discrimination
could not withstand heightened scrutiny." With that said, in same-sex
marriage litigation, the large majority of courts have rejected the sex
discrimination argument during their threshold analyses.
6
o
56. Under traditional rational basis review, courts uphold any law that is "rationally related" to a
"legitimate government interest" and defer greatly to the legislature in defining those terms. Rational
basis review does not require any proportionality between the means used to achieve particular ends.
See MURPHY, supra note 33, at IOI6-I9. Sometimes, under rational basis review, the Court has
scrutinized laws to see if they were driven purely by animus. Commentators have differentiated this
type of review from traditional rational basis review, calling it "rational basis with bite." See id. Even
rational basis with bite, however, requires less scrutiny than heightened review, which requires some
form of proportionality between governmental discrimination and the governmental goals that
discrimination is meant to further; the calculus for proportionality varies depending on the type of
heightened review involved (e.g., intermediate versus strict scrutiny). See id.
57. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
58. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), rendered moot by
amendment to Hawaii's Constitution, art. I, § 23. In Hawaii, sex discrimination is reviewed under strict
scrutiny because of the Hawaiian Constitution's Equal Rights Amendment. See Lewin, 852 P.2d at 67.
59. For example, trial judges in Iowa and California accepted the sex discrimination argument
and subsequently held that their states' bans on same-sex marriage cannot withstand heightened
scrutiny. See Marriage Cases, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129, at *8-Io (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005);
Varnum v. Brien, Case No. CV5965, (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007), available at
http://data.lambdalegal.orgpdf/legal/varnum/vamum-d-o8302007-ia-district.pdf. Both cases are
currently on appeal. See Maura Dolan, More Information Sought in Marriage Case, L.A. TIMES, June
21, 2007, at 4 (on California); see also Rick Pearson & Russell Working, Iowa Judge OKs Gay
Marriage, CHl. TRIB., Sept. I, 2007, at 3 (on Iowa). Individual judges in some states' high courts have
reasoned similarly. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 904-05 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring).
60. Among same-sex marriage cases in which state high courts have recently issued judgments,
the majority opinions have typically rejected the sex discrimination argument either implicitly or
explicitly. The argument was explicitly rejected by the majorities in Maryland, Washington, New York,
and Vermont. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (rejecting the argument during the
course of upholding a same-sex marriage ban); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d i, ii (N.Y. 2006)
(same); Baker. 744 A.2d at 880 n.13, 886 (rejecting the argument, but holding that denial of rights and
responsibilities of marriage to same-sex couples violated Vermont's constitution); Andersen v. King
County, i38 P.3d 963, 988 (Wash. 2006) (same). In Massachusetts, the majority ignored the sex
discrimination argument, even though it held that excluding same-sex couples from marriage was
unconstitutional. One concurring justice in Massachusetts supported the sex discrimination argument.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Heaney, J., concurring). However, three dissenting justices rejected the
argument. Id. at 992 (Cordy, J., dissenting, with whom Spina and Sossman, JJ., joined). The justices in
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Like Justice Scalia, state judges who reject the sex discrimination
argument have maintained that equal application of race- or sex-based
distinctions generally do not warrant heightened scrutiny because equal
application has a neutralizing effect;6 ' equally applied distinctions onl'
warrant heightened scrutiny if they subordinate a particular race or sex.
Indeed, these judges have distinguished same-sex marriage bans from the
antimiscegenation law in Loving v. Virginia.' They note that
antimiscegenation laws were clearly "anti-black" and that such racism
was dispositive in Loving, even though the Court did not say so
explicitly.64 Meanwhile, they maintain that same-sex marriage bans do
not support sex-based hierarchies,6 ' despite the link between
heterosexism and patriarchy discussed in Part I.B.
Arguably, this reading of Loving is intuitive. Antimiscegenation laws
were a form of racial segregation. It has been commonly understood
since Brown v. Board of Education66 that segregation stamps a badge of
New Jersey also ignored the sex discrimination argument, even though they all agreed that excluding
same-sex couples from the rights and responsibilities of marriage violated New Jersey's constitution.
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006).
6i. See Jeffrey A. Williams, The Equal Application Defense: The Equal Application Defense, 9 U.
PA. J. CONsT. L. 1207, 1221 (2007) ("The enduring assertion of the equal application defense is that
equal application erases the burden of a facial classification."). In Loving, Virginia's antimiscegenation
law applied equally to the two racial categories constructed by the law-"white" persons and
"colored" persons. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1967). Similarly, the racial integration
programs discussed below applied equally to the racial categories constructed by the programs-
"white" and "nonwhite" in Seattle, and "black" and "other" in Louisville. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. i, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (2007) (plurality opinion).
62. See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at ii (refusing heightened scrutiny on the basis of sex
discrimination because "[pilaintiffs [did] not argue... that [New York's same-sex marriage ban] is
designed to subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class"); Baker, 744 A.2d at 880-
81 n.i3 (refusing heightened scrutiny because "[tihe evidence does not demonstrate such a purpose
[behind Vermont's marriage laws to] ... subordinate[] women to men"); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 988
(refusing heightened scrutiny due to the belief that Washington's same-sex marriage ban did not
subordinate women); see also Deane, 932 A.2d at 6oi (asserting that, "[a]bsent some showing that [the
same-sex marriage ban] was 'designed to subordinate either men to women or women to men as a
class,"' the ban did not amount to sex discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny (quoting
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at i i)).
63. See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at ii ("[Marriage exclusions are] not the kind of sham
equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving; the statute there, prohibiting black and white
people from marrying each other, was in substance anti-black legislation."); Baker, 744 A.2d at 88o
n.13 ("[R]eliance [on Loving] is misplaced. There the high court had little difficulty in looking behind
the superficial neutrality of Virginia's antimiscegenation statute to hold that its real purpose was to
maintain a pernicious doctrine of white supremacy."); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989 ("Loving is not
analogous. In Loving, the Court determined that the purpose of the antimiscegenation statute was
racial discrimination ...."); see also Deane, 932 A.2d at 6oi ("[W]e find the analogy to Loving
inapposite."). In Loving, the Court twice noted in dicta that Virginia's antimiscegenation law was
enacted to reinforce white supremacy. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 1I.
64. See supra note 63.
65. See supra note 62.
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that de jure racial segregation of public schools was
unconstitutional).
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inferiority on traditionally oppressed groups. Therefore, connecting the
dots between Loving and race jurisprudence more broadly, it would not
be unreasonable to conclude that the subordinating dynamics of
segregation were a dispositive driving force behind the Court's decision
in Loving.
67
Commentators have retorted against judges who rely on Loving to
reject the sex discrimination argument. They contend that these judges
have misread Loving and that Loving rejected the notion that equal
application of a race-based distinction could ever shield that distinction
from heightened scrutiny. 6 Alternatively, they argue that, even if Loving
requires plaintiffs to show that an equally applied distinction
subordinates, the relationship between the law and its subordinating
purpose and/or effects does not have to be tight, since the relationship
between antimiscegenation and white supremacy was itself indirect and
attenuated. Accordingly, the sex discrimination argument easily satisfies
this loose relational requirement because of the connection between
heterosexism and patriarchy discussed in Part I.B.69
Because other commentators have thoroughly fleshed out these
existing rebuttals,0 I do not discuss them in detail here. Rather, the next
Part offers a new rebuttal to judges' reliance on Loving to reject the sex
discrimination argument: even if judges properly relied on Loving in the
past, doing so is no longer appropriate because of the Court's new
formalism.
II. THE COURT'S NEW FORMALISM AND ITS IMPLICATION ON SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE LITIGATION
In Parents Involved, the Court adopted a new formalism-a
formalism that undermines reliance on Loving to reject the sex
discrimination argument. According to this formalism, equally applied
race-based distinctions trigger strict scrutiny regardless of the
distinctions' substantive effects.
Parents Involved concerned equal protection challenges against
67. This connect-the-dots mode of constitutional interpretation has been referred to as common
law constitutionalism. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
68. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTs QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW
62-63 (2002) ("The analogy with the miscegenation cases has confused some commentators, because
they think the Court's holding in Loving v. Virginia . . . depended on its finding that such laws
endorsed the doctrine of 'White Supremacy."'); Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching
for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 107 (2OO5) (arguing
"that the racial classification [of antimiscegenation laws] by itself triggered strict scrutiny" in Loving,
and that the issue of white supremacy surfaced only during the Court's discussion of potential
justifications for discrimination).
69. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 68, at 64-70.
70. See supra notes 68-69.
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policies that Seattle and Louisville used to assign students to schools. To
combat de facto racial segregation, the school districts voluntarily
adopted policies to integrate white students with students who are racial
minorities.7'
In both school districts, students could choose the schools that they
wanted to attend, subject to some constraints, including race-based
constraints. Seattle used a racial tiebreaker, among other tiebreakers, to
determine school assignments to oversubscribed schools with racial
imbalances.72 For example, if a black student and a white student both
sought entrance to a school already over-represented by white students,
the racial tie-breaker would militate in favor of the black student.
Similarly, in Louisville's Jefferson County, students' school assignments
were based primarily on students' choices; however, when a particular
school was racially imbalanced, a student would not be assigned to that
school-even if it were her first choice-if she would exacerbate the
imbalance.73
The four-Justice plurality held that the school policies' race-based
distinctions were unconstitutional.74 These Justices subjected the policies
to strict scrutiny and found that voluntary racial integration programs did
not further any compelling government interest, and even if they did, the
school programs were not narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted
interests.75 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy also reviewed the
policies under strict scrutiny; he suggested that student diversity can be a
compelling government interest, but that the policies at hand were not
71. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746, 2749
(2007) (plurality opinion).
72. Id. at 2747. The first tiebreaker favored admission candidates who had a sibling already
enrolled in the chosen school; the second tiebreaker favored candidates based on race; and the third
favored admission candidates whose residences were located the closest to the chosen school. Id. The
race-based tiebreaker functioned as follows:
In [Seattle's] public schools approximately 41 percent of enrolled students are white; the
remaining 59 percent ... are classified by Seattle ... as nonwhite. If an oversubscribed
school is not within io percentage points of the district's overall white/nonwhite racial
balance, it is what the district calls "integration positive," and the district employs a
tiebreaker that selects for assignment students whose race "will serve to bring the school
into balance."
Id. (citations omitted).
73. See id. at 2749. In Jefferson County, "[ajpproximately 34 percent of the district's 97,000
students are black; most of the remaining 66 percent are white." Id. To achieve and maintain racial
integration, the county "require[d] all nonmagnet schools to maintain a minimum black enrollment of
15 percent, and a maximum black enrollment of 50 percent." Id.
74. Id. at 2746, 2768.
75. Id. at 2746-68. Recall that a law must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve "compelling
government interests" in order to survive strict scrutiny. For background on strict scrutiny, see
generally MURPHY, supra note 33, at IoI6-i9. The school districts asserted that the government has a
compelling interest in the educational and social benefits flowing from racially diverse schools. See
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (plurality opinion).
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narrowly tailored to achieve that goal."6 The dissenting Justices first
suggested that the racial integration programs did not warrant strict
scrutiny,77 but even if the policies did warrant strict scrutiny, they would
withstand constitutional challenge because they were narrowly tailored
to achieve the compelling government interest in diversity.7
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to note that both the
plurality and concurring opinions did not question that the integration
policies' race-based distinctions warrant strict scrutiny. They
formalistically assumed that all race-based distinctions trigger strict
scrutiny.79 The remainder of this Part first discusses the similarities
between racial integration policies and same-sex marriage bans; it then
explains how Parents Involved's formalism buttresses the sex
discrimination argument in same-sex marriage litigation.
A. NEWLY BOLSTERED SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT
i. Similarities Between Racial Integration Policies and Same-Sex
Marriage Bans
Racial integration in schools and marriage restrictions are rarely, if
ever, systematically compared. However, the two contexts do lend
themselves to comparison. Schools' racial integration programs-just like
antimiscegenation laws -embody equally applied race-based distinctions.
Consider, for example, the Seattle integration program at stake in
Parents Involved. As the Washington State Supreme Court noted, the
program was "race-cognizant" but "racially neutral," insofar as equal
application can neutralize a distinction. 8° The tiebreaker in Seattle's
integration program was applied to both white students and non-white
students. Thus, minority students were favored for enrollment in schools
oversubscribed with whites, just as white students were favored for
enrollment in schools oversubscribed with minorities.8' Louisville
similarly applied its program equally across races.
76. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Justice Kennedy highlighted reasons why the racial integration programs were not
narrowly tailored; for example, he stated that Seattle's clumping of all minority students (e.g., Asian
Americans, Latinos, blacks) into the singular category of "nonwhite" was an overgeneralization
illustrating that Seattle's program was not narrowly tailored. See id. at 2791.
77. See id. at 2811-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 2820-29.
79. See id. at 2764 (plurality opinion) (rejecting the idea that the Court should apply a standard of
review less stringent than strict scrutiny, even though the school districts may have "use[d] race for
beneficent rather than malicious purposes"); see also id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (applying strict scrutiny without question).
8o. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3 d 151, 156-59 (Wash. 2003).
81. In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that, for the 2000-2001 academic
year, Seattle's high schools had racial imbalances giving rise to tiebreakers that sometimes favored
white students and sometimes favored nonwhite students. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747-48
(plurality opinion).
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The racial integration programs in Parents Involved should be
distinguished from affirmative action programs that are not equally
applied."2 For example, when a law school recruits minorities to enhance
its overall diversity, that recruitment process is not equally applied
because it only targets racial minorities. 83 Similarly, if a government
contractor seeks out minority-owned subcontractors, such race-targeted
recruitment is not equally applied because it only targets minority racial
groups.84
While racial integration programs and antimiscegenation laws both
embody equally applied distinctions, they are certainly different. The
motivations behind the two policies are starkly dissimilar. The Court has
stated that antimiscegenation laws were driven by notions of white
supremacy." In contrast, neither the plurality nor concurring opinions in
Parents Involved suggested that racial integration programs are intended
to, or actually do, reinforce white supremacy.
Compared to antimiscegenation laws, the better analog for racial
integration programs are same-sex marriage bans. They are analogous
for at least three reasons. First, like the race-based distinctions in racial
integration programs, sex-based distinctions in marriage laws are applied
equally. Second, like the race distinctions in school policies, sex
distinctions in marriage laws do not perpetuate hierarchies between
suspect classes-at least according to most judges who have addressed
the sex discrimination argument. Third, the school policies and the
marriage status quo are both arguably integration programs. Social
conservatives have argued that sex-based distinctions in marriage laws
further the goal of integrating the sexes, 87 just as the school programs
further the goal of integrating races.88
Recognizing the analogy between racial integration programs and
same-sex marriage bans clarifies doctrine. Until Parents Involved, the
Supreme Court had never addressed state actions involving equally
applied race or sex distinctions that clearly did not subordinate a
82. The remainder of this Article uses the term "affirmative action" to refer specifically to these
programs that are not equally applied.
83. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315-16 (2002) (describing the recruitment of
underrepresented students under the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action
program).
84. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205-06 0995) (describing a contractor's
recruitment program that targeted minority subcontractors).
85. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
86. For the persuasive counterargument that sex-based distinctions in marriage laws do
perpetuate hierarchy between sexes, see supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The "End" of Marriage, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 45, 49-55 (2006)
(discussing the purported importance of sex and gender complementarity in marriage).
88. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (discussing the social benefits of racially
integrated schools).
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particular racial group or sex, respectively."' (While it is true that the
Court addressed some equally applied distinctions that were not
intended to subordinate, those distinctions nonetheless bore a taint of
subordination by enabling segregation.)' As a result of this
jurisprudential gap, state supreme courts addressing same-sex marriage
have relied on Loving-a case on equally applied distinctions that do
subordinate-to construct a threshold test for equally applied
distinctions that arguably do not subordinate. That reliance is now
unnecessary and inappropriate. Because of Parents Involved, it is now
clear that all equally applied distinctions trigger heightened scrutiny.
2. The New Formalism
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved, some
lower court judges applied a substance-based test to racial integration
cases, just as judges have applied a substance-based test to the sex
discrimination argument. Assessing whether Seattle's program violated
Washington statutory law, for example, the Washington State Supreme
Court argued that the program did not amount to race discrimination,
because the race-balancing scheme applied across races and did not
subordinate one race to another.9 This reasoning mirrors the reasoning
offered by opponents of the sex discrimination argument."
Similarly, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit and Judge Boudin of
the First Circuit have both argued that racial integration programs do not
amount to racial discrimination worthy of heightened scrutiny.93 They
both suggested that racial integration programs are applied equally and
do not reinforce racial hierarchy; therefore, they should not be subject to
89. The exception is dicta found in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 586-6o5 (2003). In Lawrence, however, neither the majority nor concurring opinions
considered the case as one concerning equally applied distinctions. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Lawrence, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
9 o . The inmate segregation discussed in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2oo5), employed
equally applied race distinctions that were intended to prevent violence, not to subordinate one race to
another. It is, however, commonly understood that racial segregation inherently subordinates. For a
discussion of inmate segregation and its subordinating effects, see infra notes 95-104 and
accompanying text. Similarly, race and sex distinctions in voter districting and jury selection are at
least potentially segregationist (in the Court's view) and, therefore, bear a taint of subordination. See
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 63o, 647 (1993) (likening race-conscious redistricting to "apartheid"); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1994) (explaining that sex-based peremptory challenges "may create
the impression that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender
or that the 'deck has been stacked' in favor of one side[]" and that sex-based peremptory challenges
are "'an assertion of ... inferiority[].').
9I. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3d 15I , 156 (Wash. 2003).
92. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
93. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d I162, 1t93-96 (9th
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (arguing for a "robust and realistic rational basis
review") Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 4 8 F.3d 1, 27-30 (st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, J., concurring)
(concerning a racial integration program under Massachusetts' Racial Imbalance Act, arguing for a
standard less stringent than strict scrutiny).
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heightened scrutiny.' 4
Both Judge Kozinski and Judge Boudin were mindful of the 2005
Supreme Court case of Johnson v. California.' In Johnson, the Court
rejected the State of California's argument that its inmate segregation
policy should be immune from strict scrutiny because inmates were
segregated "equally" and no particular racial group was subordinated."
California instituted its segregation program to prevent race-based
violence, not to perpetuate white supremacy.' Some lower court judges
had read Johnson as signaling that all equally applied racial distinctions
should trigger strict scrutiny.9s Judges Kozinski and Boudin, however,
distinguished Johnson from school integration cases due to the Court's
history of skepticism toward segregation programs.' Even in light of
Johnson, Judges Kozinski and Boudin argued that racial integration
programs should be immune from strict scrutiny because of their benign
substantive goals and effects.'"
In Parents Involved, the Court cleared away any post-Johnson
opacity regarding how to review equally applied distinctions. Parents
Involved sought to integrate races, rather than segregate races.
Nonetheless, the plurality and concurring Justices refused to consider the
case under any form of review less stringent than strict scrutiny.'"' The
plurality explicitly rejected a substance-based test for the threshold
question in equal protection analysis.' 2 Indeed, the plurality stated that
the Court should not engage in a substantive threshold analysis
separating distinctions that are used for beneficent purposes from those
used for subordination purposes.'" Although the Court had previously
refused to reduce scrutiny in affirmative action contexts (i.e., a context
without equal application) simply because of beneficent motives, 4
Parents Involved stands for the proposition that scrutiny should also
never be reduced in equal application contexts.
Parents Involved essentially rejects the substance-based threshold
inquiry that judges attribute to Loving v. Virginia. Opponents of the
94. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1193-96; Lynn Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d at 27-30.
95. 543 U.S. 499; see also Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1193-96 (Kozinski, J., concurring); Lynn
Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d at 27-30 (Boudin, J., concurring).
96. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 5o6-o7.
97. See id.
98. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1172-73; Lynn Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d at 13.
99. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1193-96; Lynn Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d at 27-30.
too. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3 d at 1193-96; Lynn Sch. Dist., 418 F.3 d at 27-30.
IOI. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2764 (2007)
(plurality opinion); id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
102. Id. at 2764 (plurality opinion).
103. Id.
104. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
1O5. Note that the Supreme Court in Parents Involved did not overrule Loving sub silentio. Parents
Involved simply favors one of two reasonable readings of Loving's dicta; it has always been reasonable
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sex discrimination argument rely on Loving for the proposition that
equally applied distinctions do not warrant heightened scrutiny unless
they are driven by malicious motives.' °6 In Parents Involved, however, the
Court applied heightened scrutiny to an equally applied distinction, even
though no Justice accused it of being borne of malicious motive.'"
Parents Involved ushers in a new formalism. Although formalism has
always existed in equal protection jurisprudence, Parents Involved
introduces a new formalistic test to the doctrine of equally applied
distinctions. As such, Parents Involved has bolstered the sex
discrimination argument in same-sex marriage cases. Judges should no
longer rely on substance-based inquiries to reject the sex discrimination
argument.
3. Counterarguments
It is worth discussing two arguments against the notion that Parents
Involved has bolstered the sex discrimination argument. First, one might
counter that Parents Involved should have very limited effects on the sex
discrimination argument since race and sex discrimination are
distinguishable. Second, one might contend that, from a realist
perspective, Parents Involved should have limited implications for the sex
discrimination argument because school integration programs burden
one particular racial group (whites) more than others. Both of these
counterarguments are, however, flawed.
It is true that race and sex discrimination are distinguishable. Note,
however, that this Article makes a very modest claim: to the extent that
judges invoke race jurisprudence to challenge the sex discrimination
argument, race jurisprudence no longer serves its function; thus, the sex
discrimination argument is strengthened. Of course, one can go further
and explain how race discrimination jurisprudence has historically played
a large role in shaping sex discrimination jurisprudenceOS This Article,
however, need not go that far. Because judges have been relying on race
jurisprudence to challenge the sex discrimination argument, it makes
sense to question whether that reliance is still persuasive.
Furthermore, the counterargument that race and sex discrimination
to interpret Loving as producing no substance-based test. For discussion on this point, see supra note
68 and accompanying text.
io6. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
io7. The four dissenting Justices stated that race-based policies seeking to integrate, rather than
segregate, are benign in intention. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct at 2815-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting,
with whom Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined). The plurality and concurring opinions said
nothing to suggest that racial integration programs are motivated by malice.
IO8. See generally Serena Mayeri, Note, A Common Fate of Discrimination: Race-Gender
Analogies in Legal Historical Perspective, 150 YALE L.J. 1045 (2OOI) (providing background on race-
sex analogies). Further discussion of race-sex analogies would certainly require lengthy consideration
of criticisms against analogizing sex to race. For a summary of existing criticisms, see id. at 1048-51.
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are distinguishable is weak because it conflates the threshold and
justification questions in equal protection analyses.'" This Article
contends that the sex discrimination argument has been bolstered with
regard to the threshold question. Yet, it is with regard to the justification
question that the law usually distinguishes between race and sex
discrimination.
Generally speaking, threshold inquiries into whether there is race or
sex discrimination proceed the same way. For example, race- and sex-
based disparate treatment are both generally considered discrimination
that triggers heightened scrutiny while disparate impact is not."'
Similarly, judges have relied on race jurisprudence to consider whether
equally applied sex distinctions amount to discrimination that triggers
heightened scrutiny."'
Upon determining that sex-based exclusions in marriage laws
warrant heightened scrutiny, courts will need to evaluate whether those
exclusions can survive scrutiny. Indeed, at this stage of the inquiry, the
divergence between race and sex jurisprudence is much starker. While
both race and sex are subject to heightened scrutiny, the former is
subject to "strict" scrutiny while the latter is subject to "intermediate"
scrutiny. 2 in federal jurisprudence and in most states' jurisprudence." '3 It
is outside the scope of this Article to fully analyze whether sex-based
marriage exclusions should survive intermediate scrutiny and this Article
does not go as far as to argue that they should not."4 This Article simply
contends that heightened scrutiny is the correct standard of review.''
to9. For background on these two questions, see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
iso. See Mayeri, supra note Io8, at IO65-67.
i i i. Judges' invocations of Loving to assess the sex discrimination argument illustrate this point.
See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
112. In federal equal protection jurisprudence, strict scrutiny requires laws to be narrowly tailored
to a compelling government interest; intermediate scrutiny only requires laws to have a substantial
relationship to an important government interest. See generally MURPHY, supra note 33, at 9o6-1019.
Sex distinctions premised on "real differences" between sexes have generally survived intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 473 (I98i) (justifying a statutory rape law
that protected underage girls, but not boys, because the sex-based distinction was based on a "real"
asymmetry: girls can become pregnant, but no boy can). For discussions on how the Court has
sometimes confused stereotyped differences for real differences, see, e.g., David B. Cruz,
Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1001-03 (2oo2); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 987- i o o 2 (1984). For a discussion on why marriage laws'
sex distinctions are not premised on real differences, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 68, at 56-60.
113. In some states, sex discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 86 (Haw. 1993) (stating that, in Hawaii, state courts review sex discrimfination under strict
scrutiny); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 973 (Wash. 2006) (noting that, in Washington State,
sex discrimination is reviewed under strict scrutiny); Wharton, supra note 55 (collecting sources).
114. Interestingly, however, judges who have reviewed same-sex marriage bans under heightened
scrutiny have typically concluded that the bans cannot survive such scrutiny. See supra note 59.
115. Note that some of the most widespread forms of sex-based distinctions can be justified, even
under heightened scrutiny. The paradigmatic example is sex segregation of bathrooms. Although the
Court has never addressed a challenge to sex segregation of bathrooms, one should reason that the
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Beyond focusing on the differences between race discrimination and
sex discrimination, one might contend that racial integration in schools
should be distinguished from same-sex marriage bans because the former
disproportionately burdens a racial group-whites. In other words, the
new doctrinal rule might be that equally applied distinctions should
trigger heightened scrutiny only if they disparately impact a particular
race or sex. This reasoning might seem intuitive because the common
refrain against race-conscious public policies is that of "reverse
discrimination." As a result of racial integration programs, whites are
probably less likely than non-whites to be assigned to their first-choice
schools." 6 In covering Parents Involved, the media often emphasized that
those who challenged Seattle's and Louisville's integration programs
were primarily white parents who claimed that the programs have the
effect of reverse discrimination."7
The disparate impact counterargument is a flawed reading of Parents
Involved. Even though the race integration programs did have a
disparate impact on white students, none of the Justices considered
Parents Involved as a disparate impact case. Thus, there is not even
dictum to support the notion that equally applied distinctions only
warrant heightened scrutiny if they create disparate impact. To the
contrary, the plurality and concurring opinions in Parents Involved
maintained that all race-based distinctions warrant heightened scrutiny. 1
Even if one incorrectly reads Parents Involved to dictate that a
disparate impact is necessary to subject equally applied distinctions to
heightened scrutiny, such a reading likely would not undermine the sex
discrimination argument. Statistically speaking, same-sex marriage bans
probably create a disparate impact based on sex. Empirical data show
that, in jurisdictions where same-sex marriage and civil unions are legal,
women have outnumbered men in registering same-sex unions.''
segregation does trigger heightened scrutiny, but is justified because sex segregation is substantially
related to government interests in protecting privacy interests. See Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 8o YALE L.J. 871, 901-02
(1971) (suggesting that sex-segregated bathrooms would survive strict scrutiny because of the
government's interest in protecting privacy).
116. In Seattle, for example, three out of the four schools affected by the racial integration
program were over-subscribed by white students; accordingly, the racial tiebreaker in Seattle's
program favored enrollment of black applicants in those schools. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2747-48 (2007) (plurality opinion).
I 17. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Cases Are a Referendum on Segregation History, RICHMOND
TiMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2o06, at AI7; Precedent Busters: Court Goes from Conservative to Radical,
DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J., June 30, 2007, at 4A; Dana Slagle, Blacks View High Court's Vote to End
Race-Based Integration Plans as a Step Backward, JET, July 16, 2007, at 4.
118. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2764 (plurality opinion); id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
ii9. See Gabrielle Giroday, Most Gay Weddings Here Involve Women, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS,
Sept. 18, 2005, at A3 (discussing data from various parts of Canada showing that same-sex marriages
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Although such data are preliminary and limited in descriptive power,
they suggest that same-sex marriage bans may very well adversely impact
t20,
women.
III. ADDRESSING NORMATIVE CONCERNS
Although the previous Part establishes the sex discrimination
argument's doctrinal strength, some advocates who support same-sex
marriage may, for normative reasons, be averse to endorsing the
bolstered sex discrimination argument. Such hesitation would likely arise
for two main reasons. First, a considerable amount of persuasive
scholarship has highlighted the normative weaknesses of formal equality
and, thus, embracing the formalistic sex discrimination argument may be
viewed as a step in the wrong direction. Second, commentators have
maintained that using the sex discrimination argument to further sexual
orientation rights oversimplifies sexual orientation discrimination and,
thus, wrongly reduces the moral claim belonging to same-sex couples.
Considering these shortcomings, this Part maintains that the sex
discrimination argument is an important but insufficient part of equality
jurisprudence. This Part prescribes ways to adopt the sex discrimination
argument without over-relying on either that argument or formalism
more generally.
A. FORMALISM GENERALLY
Commentators have criticized the formalistic nature of American
equal protection jurisprudence.' By largely focusing on form, rather
between women outnumber same-sex marriages between men); Scott S. Greenberger & Janette
Neuwahl, In Bay State, Pace of Gay Marriage Steadily Declining, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 2005, at B4
("Women make up some two-thirds of the more than 6,ioo same-sex couples who have married in
Massachusetts since gay marriage became legal."); Here Come the Brides, ADVOCATE, May 14, 2002
("Since Vermont's civil unions law went into effect, two thirds of the unions have been between
lesbian couples."). But see Press Release, Statistics Netherlands, Two Thousand Gay and Lesbian
Marriages in First Six Months (Dec. 12, 2001), available at http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/
oBDCAB42-679E-4 t 38-B7ED-A32E 5B9o5BC81o/pboie279.pdf (finding that six months after same-
sex marriage became legal in the Netherlands 55% of same-sex marriages were between men).
120. The data's descriptive power is limited for numerous reasons. The research that produced the
data failed to consider variables that may complicate the assessment of adverse impact; for example,
female couples may simply happen to outnumber male couples in the jurisdictions studied. In addition,
the research lacked a longitudinal component. For background on the complexity of statistical analysis
of disparate impacts, see generally, Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases:
Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1299 (1984) (discussing statistics and disparate impact analysis in employment contexts).
121. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Fiss, supra note
29; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. I (1977); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Lenhardt, supra
note 25; Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063 (I980).
[Vol. 59:843
FORMALISM
than substance,'22 the jurisprudence is arguably disconnected from
individual's lives, and the ways in which people actually experience
inequality. For example, many commentators have taken issue with the
Court's formalistic treatment of pregnancy discrimination.'23 They claim
that to say pregnancy discrimination is not a form of sex discrimination is
to adjudicate in the abstract, ignoring how pregnancy discrimination
actually affects the lives of women vis-A-vis men. From a substantive
perspective, it is sometimes necessary to account for differences between
men and women in order to ensure that men and women share a level
playing field, for example, in the workplace.'24 Formalistic approaches to
equal protection elide this dynamic,'25 resulting in underinclusive
protection against policies that disadvantage women. I shall refer to this
elision as the under-inclusiveness problem."'
Commentators have also criticized the formalistic nature of equal
protection jurisprudence for an over-inclusiveness problem. For
example, proponents of affirmative action have denounced formalism for
obscuring the substantive differences between invidious discrimination
against historically oppressed groups and so-called reverse discrimination
that results from affirmative action. From a formalistic perspective, both
situations discriminate because distinctions are made. For proponents of
affirmative action, this formalistic reasoning results in overinclusive
''protection" against discrimination by impeding distinctions that
arguably produce a net gain in social good."7
122. For a discussion on how American equal protection jurisprudence is formalistic, see supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 121, at 89-90; MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 56 (1990); Nancy Dowd, Work and Family:
The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 119-28 (1989).
124. Because only women can become pregnant and because there is pressure on women to
become mothers, women are uniquely burdened by pregnancy discrimination. For an argument that
substantive equality requires accounting for such differences, see generally MINOW, supra note 123;
Law, supra note I 12, at 955.
125. Formalism emphasizes treating groups the same; by stressing the importance of sameness,
formalistic reasoning elides the importance of accounting for differences. See sources cited supra note
124.
126. Although this Article has been using pregnancy discrimination as the paradigmatic case of the
under-inclusiveness problem, the problem certainly arises in other contexts. For more background on
the under-inclusiveness problem, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 1O7 COLUM. L. REV.
374, 386-87 (2OO7), discussing how commentators have identified potential under-inclusive problems
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252. 265 (1977)
(refusing heightened scrutiny of a facially neutral zoning law despite its adverse impact on blacks);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (refusing heightened scrutiny of employment testing
that adversely impacted blacks); and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
280 (1979) (refusing heightened scrutiny of preferential treatment granted to veterans despite its
adverse impact on women).
127. See, e.g., Christopher Bracey, The Cul de Sac of Race Preference Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REV.
1231, 1233, 1307-o8 (2oo6).
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Even assuming that these criticisms are valid, however, adopting the
sex discrimination argument would not necessarily exacerbate either the
under-inclusiveness or over-inclusiveness problem. As discussed below,
adopting the sex discrimination argument's formalism can foster the
desirable normative principle of antiessentialism.'1s The jurisprudential
goal, then, should be to develop a doctrine that utilizes formalism to
combat essentialism, while being careful not to further either the under-
inclusiveness or over-inclusiveness problems associated with formalism.
The remainder of this Part offers strategies for doing so.
i. Formalism's Merits: Antiessentialism
Courts develop particular formal rules because they embody
particular principles.'29 Before proceeding to a fuller discussion of
formalism's faults, it is important to highlight that the Court's new
formalism promotes a normative principle that ought to be embraced:
antiessentialism.'3 ° In academic literature, the assumption that individuals
within demographic groups share common essences is referred to as
"essentialism."''3' The antiessentialism principle challenges the
appropriateness of making that assumption.
Essentialism based on race and sex categories is problematic for at
least two reasons.'32 First, such essentialism ignores diversity within race
and sex categories. In her seminal work, Race and Essentialism in
128. "Essentialism" refers to assumptions that members of a particular social group share a
common essence. See generally Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (I990); see also Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, Ioo
Nw. U. L. REV. 1689, 1771 (2006) ("[E]ssentialization [is]... the process of assuming that cultures or
social groups can be reduced to certain core characteristics.").
129. See Cloud, supra note 20, at 220 ("[A] rule inevitably incorporates some substantive reasons.
."); cf. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 573-76 (1996) (arguing that formalism in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence supports principles of privacy, property, and liberty).
13o. As other scholars have noted, formalism's merits also include its ability to further clarity and
predictability in law, by maintaining a system of clear-cut rules. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1735-44 (2001) (discussing formalism, clarity, and predictability in contract
law); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to
Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. I, 33 (2oo0) (discussing formalism, clarity, and
predictability in equality jurisprudence); Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the
Rule of Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991 (1994) (discussing formalism, clarity, and predictability in law
generally). Rather than focusing on these merits that apply to formalism generally, this Part focuses on
formalism's particular assets in the equal protection context-namely its ability to foster
antiessentialism.
131. See supra note 128.
132. While this Article focuses on problems with essentializing social categories, the mere
existence of categories sometimes poses problems. For example, when social and political institutions
utilize the binary sex categories "men" and "women," they ignore the existence of intersex and
transgender individuals who do not (want to) fit into either category in the binary. See generally, Dylan
Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of
Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, i i MicH. J. GENDER & L. 253 (2005).
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Feminist Legal Theory, for example, Angela Harris illustrated that
treating women as a monolithic group ignores significant differences
among women-for example, differences between the life experiences of
white women and women of color.'33 Second, essentialism based on race
and sex limits an individual's self-definitional capacity because
essentialization fosters stereotyping. That is to say, if people believe that
members of a given race or sex share a common essence, they will likely
attribute shared characteristics to those categories-characteristics that
are often inaccurate or over-generalized, at best.
Stereotypes can bear negative connotations (e.g., the stereotype that
blacks are violent'34). However, even if stereotypes are not in and of
themselves negative in connotation, they are harmful because they
restrict an individual's self-definition. For example, masculine traits
(assertiveness, athletic prowess, very short hair, etc.) are not negative
traits by definition; however, people often stigmatize women for
breaking stereotypes by adopting masculine traits.'35 Indeed, mainstream
society often stigmatizes individuals for not living up to stereotypes. Men
have historically been stigmatized for acting femininely and vice versa for
women. 36 Similarly, stigma is often inflicted upon the black person who
does not "act black"'37 and the white person who acts "too black."'38
By drawing race- and sex-based distinctions, the law fuels the
essentialization process. For example, by distinguishing between whites
and non-whites the government reifies differences between whites and
racial minorities, while minimizing differences within the two groups.
The government implies that whites share commonalities that are
133. See Harris, supra note 128, at 585-86.
134. For background on this particular stereotype, see Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:
Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 751-52 (1995).
135. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), is an oft-cited case that illustrates this
point. Ann Hopkins prevailed in her Title VII case against her employer, who excluded her from
partnership because she did not "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled,.., wear jewelry," and go to "charm school." Id. at 235. Despite
the precedent of Price Waterhouse, rules requiring employees to conform to gender roles are not
always impermissible under Title VII. See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as Catch-22: Why
Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 314-15
(2oo6) (arguing that there have been instances where courts have upheld employment policies
requiring conformity to sex-based gender scripts).
136. See generally Judith Butler, Variations on Sex and Gender, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE 132 (Seyla
Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987).
137. See HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE CULTURE WARS 1OI (1992) (stating
that "[o]ne must learn to be 'black' in this society, precisely because 'blackness' is a socially produced
category").
138. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, The Virulence of Blackthink and How Its Threat of Ostracism
Threatens Those Not Deemed Black Enough, 93 Ky. L.J. 143, 147-50 (2005); Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. 873, 888 (2OO7); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By
Any Other Name?: On Being "Regarded as" Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha
and Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1283, 1303.
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somehow discrete from the commonalities shared by non-whites.'39 That
sort of rigid categorization is precisely what antiessentialist
commentators have criticized.'
4
In Parents Involved, dicta in the plurality and concurring opinions
contain antiessentialist reasoning. The plurality and concurring opinions
suggested that race discrimination is troubling-regardless of its
subordinating effects-because pigeon-holing individuals on the basis of
race wrongly diminishes their autonomy to define themselves.'4 ' For
example, the plurality emphasized that "'[o]ne of the principal reasons
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity
and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her
own merit and essential qualities." ' I42 In so emphasizing, the plurality was
not necessarily concerned with how such stereotyping subordinates a
particular race; rather, the stereotyping itself demeans individuals simply
by prejudging, suggesting that an individual's race defines her
personhood.t4
Similarly, in his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas emphasized that
"[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because
those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate
motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on
racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or
benefits, it demeans us all."'" Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy noted that
"[u]nder our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find his own
identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that
classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin."'45 In so stating,
both concurring opinions suggested that group-based subordination is
not the only evil that heightened scrutiny should be used to eliminate.
46
139. According to cognitive psychologists, the categorization of people leads individuals to
perceive minimized variance within each category and maximized variance between categories. For
background on this literature, see Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Integrating Social Identity and
Social Cognition: A Framework for Bridging Diverse Perspectives, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL
COGNITION 26 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1999).
140. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
142. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, i27 S. Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495,517 (2000)).
143. The plurality-and not Justice Kennedy-did, however, acknowledge that reinforcement of
racial lines also indirectly fosters ideas of racial hierarchy. See id. Unlike concern regarding racial
hierarchy, antiessentialist concern runs more consistently through the plurality opinion as well as the
concurring opinions by Justices Thomas and Kennedy. See infra notes 144-I45 and accompanying text.
I44. Id. at 2770 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2oo3)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
145. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy
further asserted that "[t]o be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the
dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a label that an individual is powerless to change." Id.
146. See id. Furthermore, Justice Thomas reiterated the Court's notion that "the Equal Protection
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Rather, race-based essentialism is also an evil in itself that demeans
individuals and, therefore, warrants heightened scrutiny.
The plurality was correct to identify essentialism as harmful.
However, it took the antiessentialism principle one step too far. In my
view, the plurality and concurring Justices were correct to review
Seattle's and Louisville's policies under strict scrutiny, but erred in
holding that the programs could not withstand strict scrutiny.
Antiessentialism legitimizes strict scrutiny, but it does not legitimize the
colorblindness that the plurality adopted to find that the racial
integration programs failed strict scrutiny.'47
In the context of sex, commentators have similarly derided
essentialism.' The law generally should not distinguish between men
and women, thereby coercing men and women to fulfill preconceived
stereotypes of what it means to be men and women, respectively. This
idea that individuals should not be forced into stereotyped gender scripts
is an antiessentialist critique. According to this critique, even if a sex-
based distinction does not subordinate one sex to another, it is harmful
to individuals' self-definition.
49
Interestingly, sex discrimination jurisprudence seems to already
embrace this antiessentialism principle. Mary Anne Case has argued that
the Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence can be understood as
embodying an anti-stereotyping rule.5° For example, in United States v.
Clause 'protect[s] persons, not groups."' Id. at 2765 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (I995)).
147. See id. at 2833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disapproving of the plurality's reasoning and labeling it
"colorblind," describing it as a fatal-in-fact approach to strict scrutiny); see also id. at 2788 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
148. See, e.g., Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139; Harris, supra note 128.
149. Cf. Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1473 (2002) ("'[F]ixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females' are problematic when embedded in
law, even in law that does not in any articulable way subordinate women to men." (quoting Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982))); Law, supra note 112, at 969 (advocating
protections of "each person's ability to define herself or himself, free from sex-defined legal
constraints"). For a dissenting perspective, see Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 277-78 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2005) (Parillo, J., concurring) (arguing that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples is
necessary to preserve desirably distinct gender roles for men and women).
15o. According to Mary Anne Case, the Court has developed a strict "constitutional rule against
sex-stereotyping ... [t]hat differs from a more conventional application of heightened scrutiny." Case,
supra note 149; see also Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex
Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 484-86 (2007) (arguing that it is "well
established under modern sex discrimination jurisprudence that state policies based on sex stereotypes
are unconstitutional"). Note, however, that the Court has sometimes disagreed on what constitutes a
stereotype versus a real difference. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 429, 469-72 (describing how both the majority and dissenting opinions in Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53 (2001), claimed to reject stereotypes of women). Recall that sex distinctions based on real
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Virginia, the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI's)
exclusion of women violated the Equal Protection Clause.'' Moreover,
the Court held that VMI could not remedy the situation by creating a
separate school for women, the Virginia Women's Institute for
Leadership (VWIL).'52 The State had planned to differentiate the two
schools based on sex-based stereotypes-for example, VMI would have
embodied a masculine adversarial pedagogy while VWIL would have
embodied a feminine nurturing pedagogy.'53 The Court held that such
sex-based distinctions were unconstitutional, stating that "generalizations
about 'the way women are' [and] estimates of what is appropriate for
most women" cannot justify segregated schools in the manner attempted
in Virginia.'54
The idea that "real men" partner with women and "real women"
partner with men is ultimately a sex-based stereotype.'55  The
antiessentialism critique highlights the fact that there is diversity within
each sex-including diversity in partner choice-and the fact that
coercing conformity to stereotyped partner choices limits individuals'
autonomy to decide what it means to be a man or woman.' 56 In same-sex
marriage cases, the substance-based test that judges have derived from
Loving only focuses on one substantive harm (sex-based group
subordination) to the exclusion of another substantive harm (sex-based
essentialization).
Subjecting all race- and sex-based distinctions to heightened scrutiny
would further incorporate the antiessentialization principle into
constitutional law. That is precisely what Parents Involved's formalism
does.'57 The challenge then is to embrace Parents Involved's doctrine-
differences often survive heightened scrutiny. See supra note 112.
151. 518 U.S. 515,519 (i996).
152. Id. at 550-54.
153. Id.; see also Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science
Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 189 (1996); Deborah L. Brake, Reflecting on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 35
(i997); Case, supra note 149, at 1456-57.
154. 518 U.S. at 550. (emphasis in original). To justify its decision, the Court also noted tangible
differences between VMI and VWIL in measures such as faculty reputation, budgets, and alumni
networks. Id. at 550-54.
155. See generally Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-
Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465
(2O04); see also supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
156. Again, it is outside the scope of this Article to fully analyze whether such stereotyping should
survive heightened scrutiny. This Article simply argues that heightened scrutiny is the correct standard
of review.
157. Note that this Article does not simply argue that courts should adopt the sex discrimination
argument because it embodies the normatively desirable antiessentialism principle. Other
commentators have made that policy-based argument. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 15o. Rather, this
Article argues that courts should adopt the sex discrimination argument because it is doctrinally
correct to do so; positive normative implications are a praiseworthy effect of already-existing doctrine,
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because of its desirable antiessentialist effects-while circumscribing
formalism, to further normative goals separate from antiessentialism.',
s
2. Accounting for the Under- and Over-Inclusiveness Problems
Kimberl6 Crenshaw insightfully acknowledged that the admirable
normative goal of antiessentialism can be "vulgarized" to a point where
it exacerbates other social problems, nullifying its normative appeal.'59
How can jurists ensure that the antiessentialism principle in Parents
Involved's formalism does not become vulgar, undermining other
normative goals by exacerbating the under- and over-inclusiveness
problems?
Regarding the under-inclusiveness problem,' 6°  the Court's
jurisprudence notwithstanding, jurists should recognize that a formalistic
approach to equal protection's threshold question is important but not
sufficient. Policies that distinguish people based on race or sex should
warrant heightened scrutiny because of those distinctions' essentialist
nature. However, policies that do not formally distinguish on the bases of
race or sex also warrant heightened scrutiny if they, in effect, subordinate
on the bases of race or sex."' Put differently, the threshold question
ought to embody an antiessentialism principle, protecting individuals
from the autonomy-stripping effects of coerced identity scripts; at the
same time, the threshold question ought to embody an antisubordination
principle that protects individuals from group-based hierarchies.
6
,
Applying this dual approach to the threshold question, sex
discrimination jurisprudence should dictate that sex-based classifications
in marriage laws warrant heightened scrutiny. At the same time, the
jurisprudence should dictate that pregnancy discrimination warrants
heightened scrutiny. This approach captures both of the dictionary
definitions of discrimination discussed in Part I. The fact that both of
these approaches can co-exist should dispel beliefs that the Court's new
formalism must entrench equal protection jurisprudence's existing
not a cause for new doctrinal change.
158. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, iii YALE L.J. 769, 933 (2002) (asserting that the "risk of
essentialization ought not to be understood in a vacuum, but rather relative to the risks of alternative
regimes").
159. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1296-98 (1991) (describing "[o]ne version of
antiessentialism, embodying what might be called the vulgarized social construction thesis"); see also
MARI J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE GENDER AND THE LAW, at xi-
xii (1996) (distinguishing "regressive essentialism" from "progressive essentialism").
16o. On the under-inclusiveness problem, see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
161. Cf Cloud, supra note 20, at 287 ("Some blend of formal and substantive reasoning is
inevitable and desirable. The problem is defining the appropriate mix, particularly because the choice
among decisionmaking theories implicates other values.").
162. To an extent, existing disparate impact jurisprudence embodies this antisubordination
principle; however, the threshold criteria for establishing disparate impact claims is so stringent that
antisubordination is not effectively realized. See supra notes 39-4o and accompanying text.
March 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
under-inclusiveness problem.
To address concern regarding the over-inclusiveness problem,'
3
jurists should be mindful that a formalistic approach to the threshold
question, "is there discrimination?," does not equate to a comprehensive
adoption of formal equality. The over-inclusiveness problem only arises
when a formalistic threshold inquiry is not followed by a serious,
substance-based, justification inquiry. In Parents Involved, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence was the best example of a hybrid approach,
where a substantive analysis of justification followed a formalistic
threshold analysis. Because racial distinctions are problematic in and of
themselves, Justice Kennedy formalistically accepted strict scrutiny as his
standard of review;6 4 however, unlike the plurality, he acknowledged
that the benefits of using race-based distinctions to achieve diversity can
sometimes outweigh their associated costs.' 6  By maintaining a
justification analysis that is not fatal-in-fact, courts can mitigate the over-
inclusiveness problem by permitting benign forms of discrimination.
One might question why substantive considerations should arise in
the justification inquiry and not the threshold inquiry. Should substantive
considerations sometimes shield race- and sex-based distinctions from
heightened scrutiny in the first place? The answer to that question is no
and the reasoning is twofold.
First, using substantive criteria to determine whether race- and sex-
based distinctions should trigger heightened scrutiny would be putting
the proverbial cart before the horse. Consider the example of racial
segregation in prisons. One might recognize that racial segregation
furthers the important social goal of reducing prison violence. However,
163. On the over-inclusiveness problem, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
164. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Goodwin Liu, Seattle and
Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 28o-8i (2007) ("[R]ace-conscious school assignment is not immune to
the risk of racial stereotyping and other harms associated with government decision-making based on
race. Strict scrutiny ensures that those harms are minimized or avoided.").
165. Recall that Justice Kennedy thought the racial integration programs specific to Seattle and
Louisville could not be justified because the programs were not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity;
however, he acknowledged that a narrowly tailored program would withstand strict scrutiny. See
Parents Involved, 2738 U.S. at 2789-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). The dissent also adopted a hybrid approach. After accepting strict scrutiny as the standard
of review, the dissent reasoned that Seattle's and Louisville's programs were constitutional means to
achieve the substantive goal of racial diversity. See id. at 2811-2o (Breyer, J., dissenting). Unlike
Justice Kennedy, however, the dissent started its opinion by questioning whether strict scrutiny should
be formalistically applied. See id. at 2817.
166. This combination of a formalistic threshold question and a substantive justification question,
in the form of heightened scrutiny, resembles Frederick Schauer's notion of "presumptive positivism."
See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKINO IN LAW AND IN LIFE 203-05 (i99i). Presumptive positivism directs
decisionmakers to take formal rules as presumptions that can be overridden only when exceedingly
compelling reasons for doing so exist. See id.
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it would be premature to conclude that such beneficent social goals
should shield inmate segregation from heightened scrutiny and,
therefore, render inmate segregation a matter for rational basis review.
Unlike rational basis review, heightened scrutiny ensures that there is a
close relationship between the means used (segregation) and the
particular ends achieved (violence reduction). Heightened scrutiny is a
vehicle for ensuring that the social costs of discrimination do not
outweigh benefits achieved by the discrimination.' 67 Indeed, the dictates
of heightened scrutiny prod judges to separate benign uses of race- and
sex-based distinctions from malignant uses in a transparent fashion
because heightened scrutiny requires judges to articulate the analysis of168
means and ends. Therefore, substantive considerations are best left to
the second step in equal protection analysis-the justification step.'
Second, taking the expressive function of law seriously,'70 a
formalistic threshold question sends an important message. Formalistic
application of heightened scrutiny creates a presumption against race-
and sex-based distinctions. As such, a formalistic threshold question
sends the message that society should always view race- and sex-based
distinctions with skepticism."' Treating people differently based on race
or sex is presumed evil-a necessary evil perhaps-but nonetheless an
evil that warrants skepticism. Just as the government should not
essentialize or stereotype people based on race or sex, except in rare
instances, non-governmental members of society should also seriously
question themselves before making generalizations based on race or sex.
In sum, as with the under-inclusiveness problem, adopting Parents
Involved's formalistic threshold question need not entrench the over-
inclusiveness problem. Concerns regarding the over-inclusiveness
problem can be mitigated by making sure that heightened scrutiny is
truly substantive in nature, and not simply fatal-in-fact.
167. Before proceeding, I should note that it is not within the scope of this Article to determine
precisely what the substantive justification inquiry should entail. How strict should strict scrutiny be?
Why intermediate for sex? These questions warrant a paper of their own. In previous writing, I have
suggested that the Court jettison its tiered approach to heightened scrutiny and consider a single test
for all suspect classifications. See Lau, supra note 54.
168. See Liu, supra note 164, at 280 ("[T]he very function of strict scrutiny is to distinguish between
benign and invidious uses of race.").
169. Accordingly, even if sex-based distinctions in marriage laws further some desirable social
goals (e.g., fostering stable relationships between opposite-sex parents), it should not follow that the
distinctions are shielded from heightened scrutiny. Heightened scrutiny is necessary as a doctrinal
matter. Moreover, as a normative matter, heightened scrutiny ensures that sex-based distinctions are
an appropriate means for achieving the desirable goals.
17o. For background on the expressive function of law, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. Rev. 2021 (I996).
171. On formal rules as presumptions, see supra note I66.
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3. Balance in the Discourse
The second major normative consideration concerns not formalism
generally, but the sex discrimination argument, specifically.
Commentators, including myself, have criticized the sex discrimination
argument for oversimplifying sexual orientation discrimination.'72
While sexism and heterosexism are interconnected, additional social
phenomena contribute to heterosexism-for example, impositions of a
particular religious dogma, secular sex negativity, and the lingering
effects of outdated diagnoses of pathology. These phenomena might
overlap, to some degree, with sexism, but they are significant social
phenomena in and of themselves. As Gayle Rubin once remarked on
"gender oppression": "[t]o automatically assume... it the theory of
sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one
hand, and erotic desire, on the other."'73 Erotic desire is regulated at an
intersection of social systems of which gender regulation is but one
component.
The law is a powerful tool for expressing moral positions.'74 By
framing sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination, jurists
risk reducing the moral claims of sexual orientation minorities.
Commentators such as Edward Stein, Jack Balkin, William Eskridge,
John Gardner, and Danielle Kie Hart have all argued that framing sexual
orientation discrimination as sex discrimination is morally insufficient
because it reduces a problem that implicates oppressive social norms
beyond sexism to an issue of sexism and sexism alone.'75 As Edward Stein
put it, "when a law that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation is
overturned in the face of the sex discrimination ar gument, the central
moral debates about homosexuality are bracketed."
As with concerns regarding formalism generally, specific concerns
regarding the sex discrimination argument's oversimplification of sexual
orientation discrimination can be addressed by recognizing that the sex
discrimination argument is important but not sufficient. The sex
discrimination argument is important for descriptive accuracy because,
although sexual orientation discrimination amounts to more than sex
172. See Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1296-97 (2006) (noting that the sex discrimination
argument oversimplifies sexual orientation discrimination and citing commentators who have made
the same observation).
173. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 307 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
174. See Sunstein, supra note 170 (on the expressive function of law).
175. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 68, at 67 (quoting Balkin, Eskridge, Gardner, and Kie Hart);
Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Gay and Lesbian Rights. 49 UCLA L:
REV. 47I, 506-09 (2ooi).
176. Stein, supra note 175, at 515-
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discrimination, it is a form of sex discrimination nonetheless.177
To address the insufficiency of the sex discrimination argument,
advocates for same-sex couples should assert the sex discrimination
argument in conjunction with other claims,178 such as substantive due
process claims, claims against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation,' 79 and claims to religious freedom.' Similarly, judges who
decide in favor of same-sex couples can base their decisions on sex
discrimination jurisprudence while recognizing that the couples' moral
claim extends beyond the borders of sex discrimination. '
CONCLUSION
This Article began by noting the irony of Parents Involved's effects
on the sex discrimination argument. The high court's social conservative
bloc has developed formalistic doctrine that strengthens the case for
same-sex marriage. How might that irony matter?
Commentators have suggested that constitutional law is political in
nature. ' Assuming that observation is correct, there is reason to believe
that the Justices in Parents Involved's plurality will not accept the newly
fortified sex discrimination argument. Donning the hat of a realist, one
probably would predict that the plurality is more likely to carve out some
sort of exception for same-sex marriage bans, than to subject those bans
to the heightened scrutiny consistent with Parents Involved's doctrinal
legacy.
Such speculation, however, focuses attention on the wrong forum. It
is highly unlikely that the current Supreme Court will review a same-sex
177. See Appleton, supra note 68 (discussing why "gender talk" should be regarded as an
important part of same-sex marriage debates).
178. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO
CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 182 (1996) (advocating a "double-barreled" approach to arguing for same-sex
marriage); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 538 (2001) (stating that the "sex
discrimination argument is ... only.., one arrow in the quiver").
179. On substantive due process claims and claims concerning sexual orientation discrimination,
see Lau, supra note 172, at 1297-1302.
I8O. On the relationship between sexual orientation discrimination and religious freedom, see
generally Jeffrey A. Redding, Human Rights and Homo-Sectuals: The International Politics of
Sexuality, Religion, and Law, 4 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 436 (2oo6).
I81. Such dicta is not entirely novel. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court rejected Texas's
sodomy law on the grounds of substantive due process; however, in dicta, the majority discussed
.extensively how the sodomy law also compromised sexual orientation minorities' moral claims to
equality and dignity. See 539 U.S. 558, 567, 574 (2003); see also Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and
"That" in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 Sup. Cr. REV. 75, 8o-8i (2003) (discussing the Lawrence majority's
invocation of dignity); Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, I 17 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1902-05 (2004) (discussing the role of equality in Lawrence's
majority opinion).
182. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 525,
526-27 (2005).
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marriage case any time soon. Indeed, pending same-sex marriage
litigation is concentrated in state courts. 83 State courts typically borrow
from the Supreme Court's doctrinal developments to interpret their state
constitutions. However, state courts do not necessarily share or borrow
from Supreme Court Justices' politics. In that regard, the practical effects
of Parents Involved's irony may be lost. State courts that are politically
liberal, moderate, blind, or agnostic may very well take Parents
Involved's formalism seriously and, therefore, be prompted by the sex
discrimination argument to review same-sex marriage bans under
heightened scrutiny. Doing so would be an exercise of fidelity to the
Court's newly established doctrine governing equally applied
distinctions.
Should conservative state courts reject the established doctrine on
equally applied distinctions, there will be a new data point to support
realists' belief that courts are indeed politically motivated. Even liberal
state courts may, however, be constrained by conservative state
politics.' By clarifying the doctrine that politically neutral courts should
follow, this Article contributes to the literature on the political nature of
courts, by flagging for observers a case study of courts' fidelity to
doctrine.
183. See Michael Clarkson & Ronald S. Allen, Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions: 'Til Death Do
Us Part?, 36 BRIEF 54, 54 (2007) (noting that "the legal battles and challenges [concerning same-sex
marriage] are still ongoing in most states but as of yet have not been waged in the federal courts").
184. For background on the Supreme Court's political constraints specifically, see generally
GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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